WebsterMark
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Iran’s direct ballistic missile and drone attacks have decreased sharply—by around 90% for missiles and 83% for drones—since the start of the current US-Israel campaign against Iran (Operation Epic Fury / related strikes) on or around February 28, 2026.  
As of early March 2026 (roughly one week into this phase of the war), open-source tracking and official statements show the following trend in Iranian-launched barrages:
• Day 1 (initial wave): ~350 ballistic missiles.
• Subsequent days: Dropped to ~175, then ~120, ~50, and ~40 missiles per day.
• Overall ballistic missile launches: Down ~90% (per US CENTCOM) or as much as 97% in some assessments since the opening salvos; some reports note a similar steep drop in volume toward Israel specifically.  
Drone attacks have also slowed (down ~83%), though Iran has shifted toward more frequent (but lower-impact) drone swarms as a lower-cost alternative. Total Iranian strikes on Israel and Gulf targets (US bases, etc.) started with large coordinated barrages but quickly became smaller, less effective salvos. Iran has supplemented this with proxy actions (e.g., Hezbollah resuming rocket/drone fire from Lebanon on March 2 for the first time since the November 2024 ceasefire), but the question focuses on Iran itself. 
The decrease is primarily because US and Israeli strikes have destroyed or neutralized a large share of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers, stockpiles, and related infrastructure.  
• The IDF states it has destroyed or rendered inoperable more than 60% of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers (estimates of ~300 out of a pre-war total of ~400–480 mobile launchers), plus ~80% of Iran’s air-defense systems (giving near-total air superiority for follow-on strikes).  
• This has forced Iran to ration its remaining missiles (pre-war stockpile already reduced from prior 2025 fighting) and made large-scale launches risky, as launchers are quickly detected and hit once they fire or move.
• Additional factors include strikes on production facilities, underground “missile cities,” and launch crews, plus simple depletion from the initial high-tempo barrages. Analysts note Iran is conserving what remains for a potential longer conflict while leaning more on drones (easier to produce) and proxies.  
In short, Iran’s ability to sustain the high volume of attacks seen at the outset has been heavily degraded by targeted destruction of its launch infrastructure and arsenal—not just inventory exhaustion, but active elimination of the means to fire what remains.
The pace continues to trend downward as strikes on launchers and support assets persist. Hezbollah’s recent resumption of fire is a separate proxy dynamic and does not offset the direct decline from Iranian territory. This assessment is based on consistent reporting from IDF, CENTCOM, ACLED, and open-source analysis as of March 2026.
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